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Antitrust Law
Pharmaceutical “Pay for Delay” Reexamined
Robin Feldman1
Introduction
Reverse-payment patent settlements (commonly referred to as
“pay for delay”) have been used to settle patent litigation between
brand-name drug companies and generic manufacturers; the brand
pays the generic company for an agreed-upon delay in entry of the
generic drug to market.2 In its 2010 report, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) estimated that pay-for-delay agreements
would cost consumers $35 billion over the next ten years.3
Members of the FTC urged Congress to end the sharing of
monopoly profits between brand and generic companies and
accelerate access to lower-priced generic drugs.4 Unfortunately,
nearly ten years later, no such legislation has become law.
In May 2019, the FTC reported, based on its most recently
released data, a significant reduction in the pay-for-delay
agreements most likely to be anticompetitive.5 This Chapter
examines the legal standard applied to pay-for-delay settlements
in the United States. It argues that pay-for-delay settlements may
1

Excerpted and adapted from Laura Karas, Gerald Anderson & Robin
Feldman, Pharmaceutical “Pay-for-Delay” Reexamined: A Dwindling
Practice or a Persistent Problem?, 71 HASTINGS L.J. 959 (2020).
2
See, e.g., WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., RL32377, THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT: LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
AFFECTING PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS 13 (2004); C. Scott Hemphill,
Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement As A Regulatory
Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1556–57 (2006).
3
FED. TRADE COMM’N, PAY-FOR-DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAYOFFS COST CONSUMERS BILLIONS 2 (2010).
4
How Pay-for-Delay Settlements Make Consumers and the Federal
Government Pay More for Much Needed Drugs: Prepared Statement of
the Fed. Trade Comm’n Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, &
Consumer Prot. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 111th Cong. 4, 7
(2009) (statement of Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n).
5
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Staff Issues FY 2016 Report
on Branded Drug Firms’ Patent Settlements with Generic Competitors
(May 23, 2019).
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not be on the decline, as the FTC claimed, but rather that they have
evolved to favor categories of value transfer less likely to attract
antitrust scrutiny. It concludes with a discussion of pay-for-delay
bills under consideration in Congress and offers several policy
proposals at the nexus of patent law and antitrust that strike at the
heart of the pay-for-delay problem.
The Legal Approach to Pay-for-Delay Settlements
In 2013, the Supreme Court addressed pay-for-delay
agreements head-on in FTC v. Actavis.6 There, a brand-drug
company, Solvay Pharmaceuticals, settled patent-infringement
litigation in 2006 with several generic-drug companies, including
Actavis, which sought to market a generic version of Solvay’s
brand drug AndroGel.7 In the settlement, Solvay paid tens of
millions of dollars to the generic-drug companies in return for a
delay in marketing the generic product.8 Actavis, in particular,
agreed to postpone bringing its generic to market until 2015, nine
years after the settlement but prior to the expiration of Solvay’s
patent.9 This is a fairly common example of a pay- for-delay
settlement.
Reversing the Eleventh Circuit’s dismissal of the complaint,10
the Supreme Court held that such settlements could not be
immunized from antitrust laws simply because the settlements did
not extend beyond the original term or earnings potential of the
patent.11 In the majority opinion, Justice Breyer underscored the
need to consider both patent and antitrust policies in determining
the power conferred by a patent and, therefore, in evaluating the
legality of patent settlements.12
The Supreme Court declined to label a pay-for-delay
settlement presumptively illegal.13 Instead, it held that a
6

570 U.S. 136, 140–41 (2013).
Id. at 144–45.
8
Id. at 145.
9
Id.
10
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1312,
1315 (11th Cir. 2012).
11
Actavis, 570 U.S. at 148–49.
12
Id.
13
Id. at 158–59.
7
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settlement in which the reverse payment appears “large and
unjustified” should be subject to a “rule-of-reason” legal
analysis,14 which permits consideration of “legitimate
justifications.”15 The Court did, however, open the door to a more
streamlined version of the rule-of-reason test, noting that trial
courts could “structure” the rule-of-reason test to fit varying
circumstances.16
While the Court’s decision amounted to an important
rejection of the Eleventh Circuit’s “scope of the patent” test,
Actavis did not categorically prohibit pay-for-delay deals and
arguably did not go far enough to address drug companies’
dedication to circumventing the antitrust rules in their favor. The
rule of reason promises a careful assessment but runs the risk that
its nuanced approach will amount to leniency.17 In the context of
pay-for-delay, the courts’ attempts at a balanced evaluation may
become self-defeating if drug companies veil anticompetitive
settlements with procompetitive “window dressing” in order to
avoid an antitrust violation.18
Factors that Justice Breyer articulated as suggestive of
anticompetitive effect (payments large in size and scope relative
to litigation costs and independent of services for which a payment
might be compensation)19 provide guideposts to detect a
potentially unlawful agreement but fall short of bright-line rules.
Nevertheless, since the Court’s decision in Actavis, the FTC has
brought suit and enforcement actions against several
pharmaceutical companies, including Impax, Teva, and Endo, for
unlawful pay-for-delay settlements.20
14

Id. at 158.
Id. at 156.
16
Id. at 159–60; see also Robin Feldman, Ending Patent Exceptionalism
& Structuring the Rule of Reason: The Supreme Court Opens the Door
for Both, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 61, 74 (2014).
17
Robin Cooper Feldman, Defensive Leveraging in Antitrust, 87 GEO.
L.J. 2079, 2107–08 (1999).
18
See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE
AND EXECUTION 8 (2005).
19
Actavis, 570 U.S. at 159.
20
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Concludes that Impax
Entered into Illegal Pay-for-Delay Agreement (Mar. 29, 2019); Press
Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Enters Global Settlement to Resolve
Reverse-Payment Charges Against Teva (Feb. 19, 2019); Press Release,
15
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The Evolution of Pay-for-Delay Agreements since Actavis
One regulatory response to pay-for-delay agreements has been
to mandate, pursuant to the Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (“Medicare
Modernization Act”)21 reporting to the FTC and Department of
Justice of pharmaceutical-patent settlements between brand and
generic companies in the Hatch-Waxman regulatory system.
Similarly, the Patient Right to Know Drug Prices Act, signed into
law in 2018, expanded mandatory reporting to settlement
agreements between makers of biologics and biosimilars licensed
under the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act.22
The Medicare Modernization Act enables the FTC to track
pay-for-delay settlements over time. At first glance, the FTC’s
reported data present a picture of successful deterrence since
Actavis: the number of potential pay-for- delay settlements
decreased from a high of forty in fiscal year (FY) 2012 to
fourteen in FY 2015.23 Yet the number of all settlements has
continued to increase, with 232 settlement agreements in 2016, up
from 170 in 2015.24 The suggestion that pay-for-delay deals may
Fed. Trade Comm’n, Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc. Agrees to Abandon
Anticompetitive Pay-for-Delay Agreements to Settle FTC Charges; FTC
Refiles Suits Against Generic Defendants (Jan. 23, 2017).
21
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, §§ 1111–18, 117 Stat. 2066, 2461–64
(2003).
22
FED. TRADE COMM’N, MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG AND
IMPROVEMENT ACT REQUIRES DRUG COMPANIES TO FILE CERTAIN
AGREEMENTS WITH THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (2019).
23
FED. TRADE COMM’N, BUREAU OF COMPETITION, AGREEMENTS FILED
WITH THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION UNDER THE MEDICARE
PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF
2003: OVERVIEW OF AGREEMENTS FILED IN FY 2016 (2019) [hereinafter
FTC FY 2016 REPORT].
24
FTC FY 2016 REPORT, supra note 23, at 4; FED. TRADE COMM’N,
BUREAU OF COMPETITION, AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG,
IMPROVEMENT, AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003: OVERVIEW OF
AGREEMENTS FILED IN FY 2015 (2017).
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be declining rests on an inability to categorize the agreements.
Since 2010, most agreements between brand and generics fall
into a nebulous category that I have called “Category X,” in
which the generic agrees to delay entry, but the FTC does not see
a flow of value from the brand to the generic.25 The number of
Category X agreements increased in 2016 to 151, rising from 126
the year before and a mere 75 the year the Supreme Court decided
Actavis.26
Why would generics enter into these agreements in increasing
numbers if they stand to receive no benefit?27 The answer is that,
mindful of the Supreme Court decision in Actavis, drug companies
have crafted settlements that comply with the Court’s guidance but
that may still amount to anticompetitive behavior. Fourteen
settlements contained a form of “possible compensation” along
with a restriction on generic entry; nine of the fourteen settlements
contained a provision that the brand company would not distribute
an authorized generic via a third party, which the FTC admits
“could have the same effect” as an agreement by the brand
company not to sell its own authorized generic.28 Three of the
fourteen contained a potentially anticompetitive “declining
royalty structure” that involves a reduction in royalty payments to
the brand company if it launches an authorized generic.29 An
agreement not to compete with a generic paired with delayed
generic entry has a similar impact on competition as direct
compensation for delayed generic entry. If the thirty settlements
with a pay-for-delay structure and the fourteen settlements
containing “possible compensation” are combined,30 the total
number of potentially problematic agreements in FY 2016 exceeds
that of the peak year 2012.
25

Robin C. Feldman & Prianka Misra, The Fatal Attraction of Pay-forDelay, 18 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 249, 24–65 (2019).
26
FTC FY 2016 REPORT, supra note 23, at 2; Feldman & Misra, supra
note 25, at 282.
27
See Feldman & Misra, supra note 25.
28
See FTC FY 2016 Report, supra note 23, at 1–2.
29
Id. at 2.
30
Id. at 1 (explaining that three of the thirty settlements containing a
restriction on generic entry and a form of explicit compensation also
contained a form of “possible compensation,” and so are counted in both
figures).
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Other exotic variants exist, including acceleration clauses, in
which the generic can move up the date of entry based on events
such as the release of an authorized generic or the entry of another
generic.31 Acceleration clauses can discourage other generic
companies from entering32 because they know that when they get
to market, they will face immediate competition from the settling
generic.33 In the most recent year of FTC reports, 2016, 76% of
settlements between brand-name and generic companies contained
some form of acceleration clause.34 In hints of other
anticompetitive aspects, the FTC reported that more than 90% of
all settlements between brands and generics involved the generic
receiving rights to patents not subject to any litigation between the
two companies.35 Additional rights such as these can be the
vehicles for transferring value or for sharing markets.
Hence, there is good reason to believe that anticompetitive
pay-for-delay agreements continue to be reached in the United
States post-Actavis. A reduction in explicit payments to figures
below $7 million can likely be attributed to Justice Breyer’s
emphasis on the size of the reverse payment in Actavis.36
However, a small reverse payment should not immunize
anticompetitive behavior any more than does allowing generic
entry prior to expiration of the patent in question. The “scope of
the patent” test has effectively been replaced by a “size of the
payment” test, permitting brand companies with more complex
deals but modest explicit payments to stay under the radar.
Evidence shows that settlements involving delayed generic
entry now resolve patent-challenge proceedings before the recently
created Patent Trial and Appeal Board,37 which may allow some of
31

Lizbeth Hasse, When IP Settlements Create Antitrust Headaches,
NAT’L L.J. (Mar. 21, 2016).
32
Michael A. Carrier, Payment After Actavis, 100 IOWA L. REV. 7, 37–
38 (2014).
33
Id. at 28–29.
34
See FTC FY 2016 REPORT, supra note 23, at 3.
35
Id. at 2 (“215 of the 232 final settlements involve the generic
manufacturer receiving rights to patents that were not the subject of any
litigation between the brand manufacturer and that generic
manufacturer.”).
36
See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 158 (2013).
37
Erik Hovenkamp & Jorge Lemus, Delayed Entry Settlements at the
Patent Office, 54 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 30, 30 (2018).
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these settlements to escape detection (though the FTC has declared
that settlements before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board fall
under the purview of the Medicare Modernization Act’s reporting
mandate).38 It is essential for the FTC and the courts to correctly
label settlements as unlawful pay-for-delay agreements when
appropriate, regardless of the venue in which the agreement is
reached and despite the strategic construction of settlements with
less overtly anticompetitive terms.
Policy Recommendations
Several substantive changes to the antitrust approach to payfor-delay settlements can help ameliorate the problem. First, the
key criterion in determining an unlawful agreement should be the
existence of a restriction on generic entry—not the size or
presence of a value transfer—considered in light of the strength of
the category of patent in question. Arguably, pay-for-delay is only
a problem if the patent is invalid or aimed at the wrong product,
since the generic could enter the market immediately upon that
determination. Pay-for-delay agreements tend to settle litigation
over a “secondary patent,” which covers some feature of a drug
other than the active pharmaceutical ingredient.39 Evidence shows
that secondary patents form part of a deliberate strategy to
prolong a drug’s effective period of patent protection.40 Though
few patent cases reach a final decision on validity,41 secondary
38

Jamie Towey & Brad Albert, Then, Now, and Down the Road: Trends
in Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements After FTC v. Actavis, FTC BLOG
(May 28, 2019, 12:23 PM).
39
Amy Kapczynski, Chan Park & Bhaven Sampat, Polymorphs and
Prodrugs and Salts (Oh My!): An Empirical Analysis of “Secondary”
Pharmaceutical Patents, PLOS ONE, Dec. 2012, at 1.
40
María José Abud, Bronwyn Hall & Christian Helmers, An Empirical
Analysis of Primary and Secondary Pharmaceutical Patents in Chile,
PLOS ONE, Apr. 2015, at 1, 3–4; Tahir Amin & Aaron S. Kesselheim,
Secondary Patenting of Branded Pharmaceuticals: A Case Study of How
Patents on Two HIV Drugs Could Be Extended for Decades, 31 HEALTH
AFF. 2286, 2286–87 (2012); C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat,
When Do Generics Challenge Drug Patents?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 613, 615 (2011); Kapczynski et al., supra note 39, at 2.
41
See Roger Allan Ford, Patent Invalidity Versus Noninfringement, 99
CORNELL L. REV. 71, 88 (2013).
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drug patents are frequently found invalid when challenged.42
Thus, secondary patents may over-reward a pharmaceutical
drug’s actual innovative contribution with unwarranted
extensions of patent protection. The category of the patent in
question in a pay-for-delay agreement is thus highly germane to
an examination of the potential illegality of the deal.
Next, the United States should move closer to a presumptive
standard in evaluating pay-for-delay settlements in order to
achieve more efficient and effective antitrust enforcement. The
pay-for-delay bills introduced in Congress will help achieve that
goal, as would adopting a standard similar to that of the European
Union that emphasizes an agreement’s aim to restrict competition
rather than downstream effects on the marketplace.43 Although
intent can be difficult to establish under U.S. law, those difficulties
can be overcome by designing standards that use objective criteria
as a means of inferring a company’s likely intent. The category of
patent and the failure to sue on the core chemical or biological
patent could be part of those objective criteria.
Finally, regulatory disincentives may be a more effective
deterrent of pay- for-delay deals than monetary penalties. For
example, the FTC and FDA could jointly prohibit a generic
company that is found to have participated in a pay-for-delay deal
from eligibility for the 180-day exclusivity period for any
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) that it files in the
ensuing five years. Without exclusive marketing rights as the first
generic to file an ANDA, the generic company stands to lose the
bulk of its profits on any generic drug launched in that five-year
period.44 Regulatory disincentives can counterbalance the
42

See, e.g., In re Janssen Biotech, Inc., 880 F.3d 1315, 1325 (Fed. Cir.
2018); Jeppe Brinck-Jensen & Kamilla Kelm Demant, Quetiapine Patent
Invalidated—Danish Court Follows Suit, LEXOLOGY (Sept. 7, 2016);
Jessica Hodgson, AstraZeneca Suffers U.S. Patent Blow, WALL ST. J.
(Apr. 2, 2013, 4:37 AM).
43
Eur. Comm’n, Decision of 9 July 2014, at 240–41 C(2014); Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union Art. 101(1), Oct. 26, 2012, 2012
O.J. (C 326) 88.
44
A generic company seeking FDA approval to market a generic drug
before the brand drug’s patents have expired must file a “paragraph IV
certification” with the FDA, asserting that the brand drug’s patents listed
within the FDA’s Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic
Equivalence Evaluations (also known as the Orange Book) are invalid,
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“carrots” in the Hatch-Waxman Act, thereby rewarding
innovation and hastening competition.
Conclusion
Settlement agreements to end patent disputes are common and
not in and of themselves indicative or suggestive of antitrust
infringement. Often, settlements are a favored alternative to
continuing costly litigation. However, pay-for-delay settlements
come at a steep cost to consumers by delaying the entry of lessexpensive generic alternatives to brand drugs. The ability to wield
competition laws effectively against these settlements is of major
importance to regulators, policymakers, and consumers. Shifting
the focus of antitrust scrutiny to restrictions on generic entry visà-vis the strength of the category of underlying patent, and
creating disincentives for generic companies to agree to pay-fordelay deals, will help grease the wheels of the Hatch-Waxman Act
and accelerate the path to affordable drug prices for U.S. patients.

unenforceable, or will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale
of the generic drug product for which the application is submitted. 21
U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV). The first paragraph IV ANDA applicant
to challenge a patent is eligible for 180 days of exclusive rights to market
the generic drug upon FDA approval. Id. Currently, this statutory
incentive is retained even when the patent owner does not initiate suit
against the ANDA applicant, or when the patent infringement suit is
subsequently settled. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH &
HUM. SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: 180-DAY EXCLUSIVITY:
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 10 (2017).
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